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Abstract 
Creativity has always been synonymous with humans. No other living species 
could boast of creativity as humans could. Even the smartest computers thrived 
only on the ingenious imaginations of its coders. However, that is steadily 
changing with highly advanced artificially intelligent systems that demonstrate 
incredible capabilities to autonomously (i.e., with minimal or no human input) 
produce creative products that would ordinarily deserve intellectual property 
status if created by a human. These systems could be called “artificial creators” and 
their creative products “artificial creations”. The use of artificial creators is likely to 
become a part of mainstream production practices in the creative and innovation 
industries sooner than we realize. When they do, intellectual property regimes 
(that are inherently designed to reward human creativity) must be sufficiently 
prepared to aptly respond to the phenomenon of what could be called “artificial 
creativity”. Needless to say, any such response must be guided by considerations 
of public welfare. This paper analyzes what that response ought to look like by 
revisiting the determinants of intellectual property and critiquing its nature and 
modes. This understanding of intellectual property is then applied to investigate 
the determinants of intellectual property in artificial creations so as to determine 
the intrinsic justifications for intellectual property rewards for artificial creativity, 
and accordingly, develop general modalities for granting intellectual property 
status to artificial creations. Finally, the treatment of “artificial works” (i.e., 
copyrightable artificial creations) and “artificial inventions” (i.e., patentable artificial 
creations) by current intellectual property regimes is critiqued, and specific 
modalities for granting intellectual property status to artificial works and artificial 
inventions are developed. 
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1. Introduction 
Intellectual property is a product of the mind (World Intellectual Property 
Organization: 2; Christie 2011: 6). But, the mind is not an axiom. The mind is 
usually deemed synonymous with humans. But, non-human living entities like 
plants and animals have demonstrated some form of “mind-ness” that is either 
unique or similar to that of humans (Dawkins 2012 ; Chauncey 2017 ). Moreover, 1 2
think about computers. Computers have been undertaking intellectual tasks that 
were associated exclusively with the human mind before their advent, and 
therefore, they could be argued to possess a form of mind-ness when they 
seamlessly perform complex calculations, systematically store useful information, 
and assist humans in composing artistic works and writing scientific papers. With 
our current understanding of the mind, we cannot agree (at least not entirely) on 
who possesses it, what constitutes it, and how does it function. Hence, as the 
“axiomatic mind” does not exist, we must acknowledge the mind-ness of all living 
entities — human or non-human — in all their forms and variety. 
 The absence of an “axiomatic mind” rarely obstructed the development and 
practice of intellectual property regimes around the world.  Intellectual property 3
was safely presumed to emanate exclusively from the exercise of the highest form 
of intellectual faculty possessed only by humans, i.e., creativity. Creativity in 
intellectual property regimes was understood as the unique ability in humans to 
create objects of art and innovation that could enrich human culture and advance 
human development – “creative products”. These creative products were generally 
deemed original and valuable by intellectual property regimes — reassuringly, not 
quite varying from the broad philosophical understanding of creativity (Gaut 2010: 
1039). 
 Intellectual property regimes granted the status of intellectual property to 
these creative products. The intellectual property status granted to these creative 
products included a set of rewards, namely, ascription — acknowledging the 
creator, ownership — of a set of exclusive rights over the creation, and time-specific 
monopolies — setting the expiry date for those exclusive rights. These intellectual 
property rewards were intended to encourage and inspire production of more 
creative products for the continuous enrichment of human culture and 
advancement of human development. Since, human creativity could not be 
mimicked or surpassed by any other entity — living (plants and animals) or non-
living (computers) — producing creative products was the exclusive domain of 
 Exploring the possibilities of consciousness in non-human animals.1
 Claiming that plants do have minds by virtue of being living entities.2
 See Naruto v. Slater No. 16-15469, 2018 WL 1902414 (9th Cir. Apr. 23, 2018) — the decision apparently held 3
that Naruto (the macaque monkey) could not hold and enforce copyright.
human creativity — and therefore, humans remained the undisputed recipients of 
intellectual property rewards. 
     It is true that computers could perform intellectual tasks and demonstrated 
mind-ness, but their capacity and function were limited by their underlying code 
(or their coder’s creativity). Hence, the computer’s mind was completely possessed 
and constituted by the coder, and it functioned to ultimately serve the coder’s will. 
More importantly, it could not demonstrate the capability to autonomously 
produce creative products deserving of the intellectual property status. Simply put, 
computers were not creative. 
 Artificial creators are geared towards changing just that by seeking not to 
merely assist but replace human creators and, in many ways, challenge human 
creativity. These highly advanced artificially intelligent systems (Russell and Norvig 
2013; Kaplan 2016)  are capable of producing various forms of creative products 4
deserving of the intellectual property status autonomously (i.e., with minimal or no 
human input) — “artificial creations”. Such are the claims of the developers of these 
systems and their proponents who are convinced that creativity has ceased to be 
synonymous with humans (Keats 2006 , Abbott 2016a: 19; Karpathy 2015 ; The 5 6
Next Rembrandt 2016 ; Veale and Cardoso 2019; Imaginations Engines Inc. a , b ; 7 8 9
AIVA ). This technological breakthrough culminating in the phenomenon of 10
artificial creativity — artificial creators producing artificial creations autonomously — 
is destined to have an enormous bearing on intellectual property regimes that 
seek to reward creativity. 
 No universal definition of an artificially intelligent system exists. Artificially intelligent technologies could be 4
understood as a constellation of technologies that are capable of mimicking human brain processes and 
action.
 The Invention Machine (an artificially intelligent system built using genetic programming) could produce 5
patentable creations, including antennae, circuits, and lenses.
 An artificially intelligent system built on artificial neural networks could compose texts (copyrightable 6
creations) closely resembling the iconic style of William Shakespeare, the great English playwright of the 16th 
century.
 An artificially intelligent system based on facial-recognition technology could produce paintings 7
(copyrightable creations) closely resembling to that of Rembrandt, the legendary Dutch painter.
 The Creativity Machine (an artificially intelligent system built on artificial neural networks) could produce 8
11,000 songs over a weekend (copyrightable creations).
 DABUS or Device for the Autonomous Bootstrapping of Unified Sentience (a special type of Creativity 9
Machine) could produce patentable creations, including a specially designed container-lid for robotic 
gripping and an emergency flashlight.
 An artificially intelligent system built on artificial neural networks could produce soundtracks for films, video 10
games, and commercials by learning from the compositions of legendary artists like Beethoven, Mozart, and 
Bach.
     The existing intellectual property jurisprudence was developed by law-makers, 
courts, and jurists without anticipating the possibility of artificial creativity 
(Vertinsky and Rice 2002: 576 ; Ramalho 2017: 13). Even today, the legal position 11
on artificial creativity remains unresolved (Iglesias et al. 2019 ). National and 12
international intellectual property regulators have begun to take official 
cognizance of the jurisprudential gaps around artificial creativity as it steadily 
makes its way to the creative and innovation industries (World Intellectual Property 
Organization 2019a; United States Patent and Trademark Office 2019). Broadly, 
regulators have the following legal options to consider: 
(1) Intellectual property regimes do not discriminate between artificial creations 
and human creations (Abbott 2016a; Jehan 2019) ; 13
(2) Intellectual property regimes treat artificial creations differently from human 
creations (Schönberger 2018 ; McLaughlin 2018 ; Lauber-Rönsberg and 14 15
Hetmank 2019 ; United Kingdom Intellectual Property Office Formalities 16
Manual 2019 ; European Patent Office 2020 ; Nurton 2020 ; Tapscott 17 18 19
2020 ). 20
(3) Artificial creations are deemed to exceed the purview of intellectual property 
regimes, implying that artificial creations ought not to be granted any form of 
intellectual property status (Ravid and Liu 2018 ). 21
 Arguing that current patent law regimes are not equipped to accommodate artificial inventions.11
 Explaining the need for further economic and legal research that should precede the creation of any regime 12
for the protection of artificial creativity.
 Arguing that artificial creators should be deemed as authors and inventors of artificial creations.13
 Arguing that equal treatment of artificial works and works of pure human ingenuity could possibly destroy 14
incentives for human creators
 Proposing that artificial works should be unpatentable.15
 Claiming that the difficulty in implementing mandatory/voluntary disclosure of artificial creativity in 16
copyrightable creations would lead to the integration of artificial works in the copyright regimes, disrupting 
the foundational doctrines of copyright.
 Precluding artificial inventorship for artificial creators.17
 Rejecting the proposition of artificial inventorship by holding that the inventor must be a natural person.18
 Reporting European Patent Office’s (EPO) and United Kingdom Intellectual Property Office’s (UKIPO) 19
rejection of patent applications that had named an artificial creator as an inventor; both EPO and UKIPO held 
that the inventor must be a natural person.
 Reporting United States Patent and Trademark Office’s (USPTO) rejection of patent applications that had 20
named an artificial creator as an inventor; USPTO held that the inventor must be a natural person.
 Arguing that intellectual property status is irrelevant for artificial inventions.21
 This paper contains (a) a roadmap to arrive at the option which could 
demonstrate good congruence with the intrinsic justifications for intellectual 
property, and (b) suggest or devise intellectual property modalities accordingly 
which could aptly respond to artificial creativity. 
1.1 Policy Relevance of the Paper 
Artificial creators demonstrate incredible capabilities to mimic, and even surpass 
human creativity — that puts them on a trajectory to redefine the mainstream 
production practices in the creative and innovation industries. Hence, their cultural 
and economic impacts on our lives must not be underestimated.  
 Live every new technology, they promise rich benefits, but not without 
significant risks. Their autonomy is fascinating, but artificial, at the end of the day. 
They ultimately derive their autonomy from us. That means they are not entirely 
beyond human control.  
 Hence, we should assume at least some form of responsibility for (a) how we 
encourage and facilitate their development, deployment, and use, (b) what they 
ending up creating, and (c) how their artificial creations are deployed. These 
questions constitute the subject of policy research and policy analyses that should 
not be relegated to artificially intelligent systems even if it could be — if we are to 
retain agency over our lives. 
 With the likely increase in the usage of artificial creators in the creative and 
innovation industries, artificial creations would proliferate. If artificial creations 
ought to be granted the status of intellectual property in some form, the need to 
strike an optimal balance between private monopoly over these creations and 
public access to these creations (like for creative products) cannot be 
overemphasized — towards securing and maximizing public welfare.  
 Proposals from this paper could guide policymakers in developing an 
intellectual property regime for artificial creations in addressing this emerging 
critical need.  
1.2 Structure of the Paper 
  
 In Chapter 2, intellectual property is introduced as a set of rewards granted 
by the State on an exclusive-basis to a creator for a limited period of time. Then, 
the factors that determine these intellectual property rewards are analyzed.  
 In Chapter 3, intellectual property rewards are discussed as incentives for 
human creativity that must be used with sufficient caution. 
 In Chapter 4, modes of intellectual property rewards are analyzed in terms 
of how ex ante determination of certain intellectual property rewards that are 
determined by constant factors is superior to their ex post determination, and how 
ex post determination of certain intellectual property rewards that are determined 
by variable factors is superior to their ex ante determination. 
 In Chapter 5, factors determining intellectual property rewards (or intrinsic 
justifications for intellectual property) are examined and analyzed in artificial 
creations. 
     In Chapter 6, proposals for general modalities for artificial creations are 
developed. 
 In Chapter 7, based on the findings in the preceding chapters, the 
treatment of artificial creativity by current national intellectual property laws are 
critiqued. 
 In Chapter 8, a blueprint (comprising specific modalities) for granting 
intellectual property status to artificial works and artificial inventions is proposed. 
 In Chapter 9, key findings and recommendations from this paper are 
summarized. 
2. Determinants of Intellectual Property 
Intellectual property is a set of rewards granted by the State over creative products 
on an exclusive-basis to the creator for a limited period of time to secure and 
maximize public welfare. These rewards include: ascription — acknowledging the 
creator, ownership — of a set of exclusive rights over the creation, and time-specific 
monopolies — setting the expiry date for those exclusive rights. These rewards are 
determined by the following factors: 
2.1 Human Ingenuity in Creative Products 
Intellectual property regimes treat creativity as an intellectual function, i.e., an act 
whose origins lie in the human mind (Christie 2011: 6). However, not all products 
emanating from the intellectual function are treated as creative by intellectual 
property regimes. 
     It is only when the intellectual function ends up creating a product that 
demonstrates a modicum of human ingenuity, do intellectual property regimes 
start recognizing that product as creative — with the distinct purpose of rewarding 
the intellectual function that led to the creation of that creative product. It is 
because the State treats creative products either as an objects of art enriching 
human culture or as objects of innovation advancing human development, and 
hence, encouraging their production necessary to secure and maximize public 
welfare.   22
     The degree of human ingenuity exercised to arrive at a creative product 
decides the specific modalities of intellectual property rewards that the State 
ought to grant for that product. When the threshold for human ingenuity in a 
product to qualify as creative is lower, the strength of enforceability of intellectual 
property rewards granted by the State over that product is typically also lower, and 
vice-versa.  When the human ingenuity contributed in producing a creative 23
product is shared between two or more individuals, all such persons receive these 
rewards typically in proportion to their respective contributions.  24
 E.g., copyright regimes reward original creations to promote art and enrich human culture, and patent 22
regimes reward novel, non-obvious, and useful creations to promote innovation and advance human 
development.
 E.g., patentable creations demonstrate higher human ingenuity, and are afforded stronger protection 23
against infringement; copyrightable creations demonstrate lesser human ingenuity and are afforded weaker 
protection against infringement.
 E.g., through joint inventorship for patentable creations, and co-authorship for copyrightable creations.24
2.2 Moral Interest in Creative Products 
Like all types of human activity, creativity seeks rewards that could vary in form and 
magnitude depending on the context in which creativity occurs. But, an essential 
context-independent reward for creativity is the creator’s desire to be known for 
her creation. This desire to be known is the creator’s moral interest — manifested in 
her creation. The State seeks to protect this interest against abuse by mandating 
that a creative product must be ascribed to only the creator whose human 
ingenuity led to its creation, and nobody else. 
 The State does it as a moral imperative to bring individual justice to the 
creator (Christie 2011: 10) by granting her what is arguably the foremost reward in 
an intellectual property regime — honest ascription. Honest ascription enables the 
State to save creators from getting discredited for their creativity so that they do 
not get discouraged from expressing it. In creative industries, honest ascription 
also enables a creator to earn a reputation for creativity that is commercially 
exploitable (on an indefinite basis) so that h/she is constantly encouraged to come 
up with more creative products (Government of United Kingdom 2006: 51 ). 25
2.3 Legal Capacity of Creators 
For intellectual property rewards to serve an intelligible legal purpose, the person 
who receives them must demonstrate the necessary legal capacity to: (a) 
meaningfully enjoy those rewards, and (b) respond to liability claims resulting from 
harm caused by the nature and use of creative products. (Okediji 2018: 19). 
Hence, besides serving a moral purpose, honest ascription also serves a functional 
(legal) purpose. 
 Sometimes, creative products, by their very nature, might risk harming 
public order and safety, thereby compromising public welfare. Honest ascription 
for a creative product enables the State to hold the true creator of that product 
liable for harm and effectively discourage the production of creative products that 
are intrinsically harmful. For instance, Article 19(1)(2) of the Indian constitution 
imposes reasonable restrictions on the freedom of speech and expression (i.e., 
copyrightable creations) if it risks harming public order and safety; defaulters 
(transgressing these restrictions) are prosecuted by the Indian State according to 
applicable laws. Similarly, inventors are expected to invent responsibly so that their 
inventions do not pose imminent risks to public order and safety (Stilgoe et al. 
2013 ). 26
 Claiming that creators can exploit their celebrity status to make money by appearing in advertising 25
campaigns and by selling branded merchandise.
 Proposing that research and innovation must accommodate social and ethical concerns.26
 Sometimes, creative products, through their misuse, might risk causing 
harm to public order and safety, thereby compromising public welfare. In all such 
cases, the State may choose to penalize the owner of the product who is deemed 
to exercise control over its use. For instance, book publishers could be held liable 
for irresponsibly disseminating writings that risk harming public order and safety 
(Seeber and Balkwill 2007: 29). Similarly, product liability laws penalize the 
manufacturer for non-compliance with due diligence requirements while 
introducing innovative products (i.e., patentable creations) into the market, risking 
harm to public order and safety (European Council Directive 85/374/EEC, 25 July 
1985). 
 But, in order to do so, the State must ascertain the legal capacity of the 
person (natural or artificial) who holds ascription/ownership over that creative 
product. Only if such a person is legally eligible to anticipate the harmful 
consequences resulting from the nature or misuse of her creative product, could 
h/she be held liable for those consequences. This premise holds true for the same 
jurisprudential reasons that uphold juvenile justice and differential treatment of 
criminal offences committed by persons of unsound mind. 
 Hence, minors experience difficulties in enforcing intellectual property 
rewards even as they are entitled to hold them as creators (Lukose 2013 ). At the 27
same time, corporates can acquire and enforce intellectual property rewards even 
as they are not the creators . Corporates are artificial persons that demonstrate 28
legal personhood, i.e., the juridical capability to enter into intellectual property 
contracts, understand the nature of their contractual obligations, and compensate 
for harms resulting from their omission or improper performance of those 
obligations. The State allows corporates to acquire and enforce intellectual 
property rewards to encourage corporate investment in the production of creative 
products with the ultimate goal of maximizing public welfare. 
2.4 Economic Investment in Creative Products 
Coming up with creative products could be expensive, demanding significant 
economic investments. As such, persons (natural or artificial) who invest in creative 
products would naturally expect good returns on their investments in order to be 
able to continue with their creative journey. 
 Ownership of creative products can make that happen. Persons investing in 
creative products could exercise possession (a key constituent right in ownership) 
 Explaining how contractual incapacity disables minors from commercially exploiting their intellectual 27
property.
 For instance, through employer-employee/work for hire agreements or through a simple purchase.28
of their products to sell them or rent out their specific uses. However, possession 
of creative products is almost oxymoronic. This is because creative products are 
intangible and non-excludable by nature (unlike physical property like real estate 
and automobiles). Hence, possession of property in the classical sense of physical 
property cannot be applied to creative products. So, the State grants a set of 
exclusive rights to the creator over her creative product. These rights constitute the 
subject matter of ownership for the creator and make possession of the creative 
product by her creator possible (Christie 2011: 7). 
 But, these exclusive rights have an expiry date, i.e., they remain a time-
specific monopoly. This is because the State acknowledges that creative products 
are non-rivalrous and inexhaustible. In other words, use and enjoyment of a 
creative product by one person does not hamper the use and enjoyment of that 
product by another person (Christie 2011: 6-7). Hence, the State concludes that 
creative products (unlike physical property) could be better utilized by its people 
through sharing so as to maximize public welfare. Accordingly, the State grants a 
monopoly on the exclusive rights only for such period of time that ought to enable 
the creator to recover her economic investment in her creative product, i.e., earn 
normal profits from her creation (Olson 2009); after the expiry of this time period, 
the creation is ought to be made public.  
 A time-specific monopoly is a special economic award created by the State 
only to reward that modicum of human ingenuity that produces creative products 
(Hughes 1988: 23 ). In other words, in the absence of that modicum of human 29
ingenuity, time-specific monopolies cannot be justified. It is because monopolies 
are generally bad. Hence, any use of time-specific monopolies by the State must 
be extremely restrictive (MacCauley 1841). It should then follow that if human 
ingenuity in a creative product is reduced, the length of the time-specific 
monopoly granted for that product must also reduce. 
 The length of the time-specific monopoly to be granted over the ownership 
of a certain creative product should be determined by the State as a function of 
the economic investment put into that product (Sherer 1972 ). However, this does 30
not mean that higher the economic investment, greater would be the length of the 
time-specific monopoly. Obviously, market demand of the creative product would 
play another key role. But, the market demand for any creative product is generally 
hard to predict (Borisova 2018: 114) .  31
 Claiming that it is uniqueness of an idea that qualifies it for intellectual property protection.29
 Proposing that the length of a patent monopoly should be flexible and product-specific, deriving its basis 30
from the economic characteristics of the invention it seeks to reward).
 Explaining the difficulties in determining the market potential of creative products that -- unlike products 31
intended for mass consumption – may not necessarily respond to public needs or preferences.
     Hence, the State should give precedence to economic investment put into a 
creative product over its market demand for determining the length of the time-
specific monopoly — in which the creator is expected to only recover her economic 
investment. If the demand for that product in the market becomes favourable, the 
creator of that product enjoys the liberty to raise its renting or selling price (as in a 
monopoly, consumers are price takers), thereby enabling herself to earn a 
supernormal profit from the rental or sale of her creative product. 
2.5 Key Takeaways 
To recapitulate, intellectual property rewards for creative products are determined 
by: 
(1) The creator’s human ingenuity in her creative product;  
(2) The creator’s moral interest in her creative product; 
(3) The legal capacity of the person (natural or artificial) to enjoy intellectual 
property rewards granted over the creative product and assume liability for 
mishaps caused by the nature or misuse of the creative product; and  
(4) The economic investment of the person (natural or artificial) in the creative 
product. 
 However, to know the necessary justifications for ascription, ownership, and 
time-specific monopolies granted for creative products, we must break down each 
of these rewards into the necessary factors that ought to determine them. Hence, 
from our discussion in this chapter, we can say: 
(a) Ascription is a function of human ingenuity and moral interest; 
(b) Ownership is a function of legal capacity and economic investment; 
(c) Monopoly is a function of human ingenuity and economic investment. 
The table below summarizes these points: 
   = Necessary     . = Sufficient 
Human 
Ingenuity
Moral Interest Legal Capacity Economic 
Investment
Ascription . .
Ownership . .
Time-Specific 
Monopolies
. .
 
 
 
  
 
3. Nature of Intellectual Property Rewards 
Intellectual property rewards derive their origin from one of the fundamental 
economic principles which holds that people respond to incentives. Incentives 
tend to mould human behaviour and could provide great utility in implementing 
policy changes. However, this principle is not infallible: 
(1) In the short run, while incentives (as extrinsic stimuli) could induce positive 
behaviour to achieve a desired policy outcome, they risk weakening “intrinsic 
motivations” in people to behave desirably in the long-run (Gneezy et al. 2011). 
(2) The change in behaviour in response to an incentive cannot always be subject 
to quantification or other objective assessments. 
 Intellectual property rewards represent nothing but incentives offered by 
the State to encourage the production of creative products. 
 Hence, typical criticisms against incentives moulding human behaviour 
must also hold true for intellectual property rewards encouraging creators and 
corporates to produce and invest in creative products. 
3.1 Intellectual Property Rewards Weaken “Intrinsic Motivations” 
to Create 
It cannot be denied that many of the mankind’s greatest creations were produced 
several hundred years before intellectual property regimes had even begun to 
develop in various parts of the world. Even when file-sharing broke the Internet in 
early 2000s, the weakening of the copyright regimes did not correspond to a 
reduction in the growth of copyrightable creations; on the contrary, it 
corresponded to a sharp increase in the growth of copyrightable creations (Felix 
and Koleman 2010 ). 32
 This implies that the creativity is not uniquely dependent on intellectual 
property rewards. By extension, it would mean that humans possess intrinsic 
motivations to come up with creative products. Since incentives generally tend to 
destroy intrinsic motivations in people to behave desirably in the long-run, intrinsic 
motivations of creators to come up with creative products might gradually weaken 
in response to intellectual property rewards, if not handled correctly by the State 
(Amabile and Kramer 2012). 
 Claiming that even as file-sharing technology in recent times has weakened copyright protection, 32
copyrightable creations continue to grow.
3.2 Quantification of Change in Creativity Induced by Intellectual 
Property Rewards is Not Possible 
Ideally, the incentive and the intended behaviour change associated with that 
incentive should ideally be measurable in quantifiable terms. For example, when 
the government increases the tax rate on the per unit sale of cigarettes, the 
decrease in cigarette consumption can be measured in quantifiable terms so as to 
analyze the efficacy of government policy in discouraging people from smoking 
with a fair degree of objectivity.  
 Intellectual property rewards cannot be expressed as mathematical 
functions as most factors determining them cannot be quantified. Hence, the 
precise economic value of all the intellectual property rewards to be granted for a 
creative product, for the most part, remains immeasurable. Calculating the 
economic value of that product, on the other hand, looks more achievable as it can 
be expressed in terms of its price in the market. But again, the price of a creative 
product would depend on its market demand that remains hard to predict. 
Besides, a creative product could be invaluable as well.  33
 Hypothetically, even if one somehow manages to express intellectual 
property rewards and the value of creative products in quantifiable terms, one still 
cannot measure the precise impact of intellectual property rewards on creativity in 
the absence of a counterfactual. Hence, one cannot conclude if intellectual 
property rewards are must for incentivizing creativity. 
 On the contrary, studies have found that intellectual property rewards can 
have a negative effect on the production of creative products and public welfare 
(Torrance and Tomlinson 2009 ) — and public welfare could be higher with no 34
intellectual property rewards for creative products (Pollock 2008 ).  35
 Besides, the proliferation in combinatorial creativity (Varian 2010) (Youn et 
al. 2015) demanding less human ingenuity —  seems to be inspired more by 
human greed than by motivations to enrich human culture and advance human 
 E.g., several artistic, musical, and literary works that are not intended to be sold by their creators - 33
copyrightable creations.
 Claiming that the current patent system (a combination of patent and open source protection) produces 34
significantly lower rates of innovation and societal utility than a commons system.
 Claiming that the innovator typically has a first-mover advantage as imitation of innovation is costly – 35
implying that the societal costs actually outweigh the societal benefits accrued from intellectual property.
development — and implies the inefficacy of intellectual property rewards in 
incentivizing what ought to be transformational creativity (Bell 2006 ). 36
 Nevertheless, other studies have shown that in the absence of intellectual 
property rewards creative and innovation industries might slow down — and 
compromise public welfare (Arrow 1962 ; Park and Ginarte 1997 ; Duguet and 37 38
Lelarge 2012 ; Posner 2012 ). 39 40
3.3 Key Takeaways 
Intellectual property rewards though are intended to incentivize the production of 
creative products, they might gradually weaken intrinsic motivations in creators to 
come up with creative products. Moreover, the net effect of intellectual property 
rewards on the production of creative products is moot.  
 Hence, intellectual property rewards must be used with caution, i.e., these 
rewards must be granted by the State to reward creativity only after thoroughly 
examining the factors of human ingenuity, moral interest, legal capacity, and 
economic investment that ought to determine them -— only towards securing and 
maximizing public welfare, and nothing else (Chopra 2018). 
 Claiming that copyrights have primarily encouraged entertaining works that sell, and patents have 36
encouraged “marginal improvements in mature technologies”.
 Claiming that competitive markets by themselves cannot provide incentives for individuals and firms to 37
come up with new inventions; those incentives could be provided only by the government).
 Showing that strong intellectual property rights were positively correlated with high investments in research 38
and development.
 Claiming that patents overall incentivize firms to come up with product innovations.39
 Claiming that drug innovation is likely to be discouraged if not granted strong patent protection (as the cost 40
of producing novel drug is very high while producing its identical substitute is very low). 
4. Modes of Intellectual Property Rewards 
The fallible nature of intellectual property rewards demands that the respective 
modes of their adoption by the State for incentivizing creativity must be 
accompanied by sufficient caution. While determining a specific reward for a 
creative product, only the necessary factors that ought to determine that reward 
for the product must be examined, i.e.,  
(a) Ascription should be treated as a function of human ingenuity and moral 
interest; 
(b) Ownership should be treated as a function of legal capacity and economic 
investment; and 
(c) Time-specific monopoly should be treated as a function of human ingenuity 
and economic investment (see Chapter 2.5). 
 In the current intellectual property practice, intellectual property rewards 
are codified, i.e., they are conceived and decided ex ante by legislative bodies and 
remain fixed (static) within statutorily designated intellectual property 
classifications like copyrights and patents.  
 Copyright is a statutorily designated class of intellectual property protecting 
original artistic, musical, and literary creations in all their types, forms, and uses. 
Patent is another statutorily designated class of intellectual property like copyright, 
except that it protects novel, non-obvious, and useful creations. 
 Each of these statutorily designated classifications of intellectual property 
are founded on a common presumption. The presumption is that all creative 
products within a given classification, copyright or patent, do not vary by factors of 
human ingenuity, moral interest, legal capacity, and economic investment. This 
presumption basically justifies the possibility of determining intellectual property 
rewards ex ante for copyrightable and patentable creations. 
  
4.1 Ex Ante Determination of Ascription and Ownership is 
Essential and Justified 
Defining rules and regulations for the ex ante determination of ascription and 
ownership for creative products is essential for securing legal certainty for creators 
in the intellectual property regimes. 
 It is also justified as it is fairly possible to define clear-cut legal standards to 
represent factors that would be necessary for a claim of ascription (namely, human 
ingenuity and moral interest) and ownership (namely, legal capacity and economic 
investment) even before new creative products come into actual existence. In 
other words, human ingenuity, moral interest, legal capacity, and economic 
investment could be treated as constants for determining ascription and 
ownership for creative products. 
 For example, human ingenuity and moral interest is represented by 
authorship/co-authorship for copyrightable creations; for patentable creations, 
they are represented by inventorship/joint inventorship. Ownership of both 
copyrightable and patentable creations can be assumed and exercised by persons 
(natural or artificial) who have either economically invested in these creations 
either by hiring or employing creators or through a simple purchase. 
4.2 Ex Ante Determination of the Length of Time-Specific 
Monopolies is Unjustified 
Time-specific monopolies over a creative product are intended to enable the 
creator of that product to only recover her economic investment that were put into 
the creation. These economic investments actually vary significantly for different 
creative products — even when these products fall within one designated 
intellectual property classification, i.e., not all copyrightable creations would bear 
the same economic investment, and not all patentable creations would bear the 
same economic investment. Hence, economic investment as a factor for 
determining the length of the time-specific monopoly over the ownership of a 
creative product should not be treated as a constant (Thurow 1997 ; Government 41
of United Kingdom 2006: 39 ). 42
 Note that here, we are distinguishing between the existence of economic 
investment and the quantum of economic investment. Existence of economic 
investment could be safely treated as a constant for determining ownership of a 
creative product ex ante. However, quantum of economic investment tends to 
become variable across creative products. 
 Hence, ex ante determination of a fixed (static) length of time-specific 
monopolies over the ownership of creative products that remain actually 
dependent on a variable factor (quantum of economic investment) risks over-
rewarding creativity (unduly preventing others from creating — having a chilling 
 Questioning the rationality of granting patent monopolies of a uniform length (20 years) even as costs 41
across patentable creations would vary significantly.
 Claiming that given the extensive range of copyrightable creations, it is not possible to arrive at one 42
“definitive optimal length” for all copyrightable creations.
effect on creativity) or under-rewarding creativity (failing to sufficiently encourage 
creativity) (Fraser 2016). This ultimately compromises public welfare. 
 It also implies that the optimal length of time-specific monopoly to be 
granted over a creative product (i.e., one that balances the creator’s returns on her 
economic investment in her creative product with public welfare) cannot be 
determined ex ante. For this reason, many have criticized the long, uniform terms 
of copyright and patent monopolies (Landes and Posner 2003 ; Boldrin and 43
Levine 2005 ; Lester and Zhu 2019 ). 44 45
 It should then necessarily follow that public welfare would be better 
secured through an ex post determination of the length of time-specific 
monopolies (i.e., after the quantum of economic investment has been 
ascertained). 
4.3 Key Takeaways 
Statutorily determining ascription and ownership for creative products ex ante is 
recommended. But, determining the length of time-specific monopolies over the 
ownership of creative products ex ante grossly discounts the uniqueness and 
variability of measures of economic investments that they bear — overall risking 
abuse of time-specific monopolies through over-rewarding creativity (unduly 
preventing others from creating — having a chilling effect on creativity) or under-
rewarding creativity (failing to sufficiently encourage creativity) — ultimately 
compromising public welfare. 
 If deciding the time-specific monopoly component of diminished 
intellectual property rewards for each creative product ex ante looks too wieldy for 
copyright and patent offices, sub-classifications under copyrightable creations and 
patentable creations could be devised, where each sub-classification represents 
and carries products bearing similar quanta of economic investment and market 
demand. 
 Suggesting that extend the time-length of any intellectual property monopoly beyond 25 years would 43
create little extra incentives for creators.
 Suggesting that the optimal length of a copyright monopoly should be seven years.44
 Quoting economists’ criticisms against the practice of granting flat 20-years long patent monopolies on 45
inventions without any regard to their economic characteristics.
5. Determinants of Intellectual Property in Artificial Creations 
Developers of artificial creators and their proponents claim that an artificial 
creation is a creative product that is generated by a highly advanced artificially 
intelligent system autonomously. In this chapter, we check for human ingenuity, 
moral interest, legal capacity, and economic interest in artificial creations for 
examining the existence of intrinsic justifications for intellectual property rewards 
for artificial creativity. 
5.1 Human Ingenuity in Artificial Creations 
Developers of artificial creators and their proponents claim that the exact nature 
and composition of artificial creations remains unpredictable. Hence, they argue 
that artificial creators demonstrate a form of “mind-ness” that could replace human 
creativity in producing creative products. However, the argument is tenable only 
for the “moment of creation” — i.e., when the artificial creation comes into 
existence.  
 The argument does not hold good for what precedes the moment of 
creation. The mind-ness exhibited by artificial creators does not come out of thin 
air; it is meticulously constructed by its developers who tirelessly employ their 
human minds to build it to serve a defined purpose (irrespective of how broad that 
purpose might be). In other words, the mind-ness exhibited by artificial creators 
has its origins in the minds of their creators, and at least the broad contours of 
what artificial creators can and cannot do are consciously determined by their 
developers. Hence, the source of artificial creativity must lie in the human ingenuity 
of its developers (Plotkin 2009: 57-58 ). 46
     Simply put, artificial creativity is an artificial function created by human 
ingenuity. The mere fact that the artificial function is unpredictable owing to its 
broadly defined purpose does not make the artificial creator an autonomous entity 
like humans. The initial criticality of human ingenuity in producing artificial 
creations must not be completely discounted (Blok 2017 ; Shemtov 2019 ). That 47 48
 Arguing that human ingenuity is not expendable in the invention process yet.46
 Claiming that artificial creators producing patentable creations are mere tools in the inventive process in 47
which human input remains inevitable.
 Arguing that conception of the artificial invention should be attributed to the natural person who set up the 48
artificial creator; whether such person could predict the exact nature and composition of the artificial invention 
should be immaterial to deciding the attribution of its conception).
said, at same time, the absence of human ingenuity (or creativity) in the moment of 
creation must not be ignored (Abbott 2016a: 1103; Abbott 2016b: 14) . 49
 In other words, even as human ingenuity is initially critical to producing 
artificial creations, its eventual contribution is negligible in producing artificial 
creations, i.e., the total contribution of human ingenuity in producing artificial 
creations has diminished. A product is deemed creative in intellectual property 
regimes when it demonstrates at least a modicum of human ingenuity. Hence, it 
follows that artificial creations should be deemed less creative in comparison to 
creative products that result from the exercise of pure human ingenuity. Moreover, 
this diminished human ingenuity put into producing an artificial creation may be 
shared between two or more natural persons (like for any creative product). 
 Hence, the State ought to conceive intellectual property rewards that aptly 
respond to the diminished human ingenuity in an artificial creation and distribute 
rewards amongst the developers of the artificial creator in proportion to their 
respective contributions to that diminished human ingenuity. 
5.2 Moral Interest in Artificial Creations 
As stated previously, human ingenuity in artificial creations must not be completely 
discounted. Hence, honest ascription for an artificial creation would demand that 
the natural person whose human ingenuity is the source of that artificial creation is 
not entirely discredited for it as that person must reasonably have at least some 
moral interest in that artificial creation. At the same time, artificial creators cannot 
intelligibly demonstrate moral interest in their artificial creations (Perry and 
Margoni 2010: 627). Hence, the State ought to conceive intellectual property 
rewards that aptly respond to the reduction in moral interest of the developers of 
artificial creators in artificial creations. 
5.3 Legal Capacity of Artificial Creators 
Artificial creators cannot foreseeably demonstrate legal capacity either to (a) 
meaningfully enjoy intellectual property rewards for artificial creations (Perry and 
Margoni 2010: 627) (Okediji 2018: 19), or (b) respond to liability claims resulting 
from the harm caused by their nature or misuse of artificial creations. That said, 
intellectual property rewards that may be granted for artificial creations could be 
legally enjoyed by the developers of artificial creators whose initial exercise of 
human ingenuity brought them into existence and/or by artificial persons 
 Arguing that the natural person who set up the artificial creator did not contribute significantly to the 49
patentable creations produced by the artificial creator; hence, recognizing such natural person as the inventor 
of the artificial inventions would be inefficient and unfair).
(corporates) who have economically invested in them. Besides, artificial creations, 
by their nature or misuse, may risk causing harm to public order and safety. In all 
such cases, the State ought to fix appropriate liability on persons (natural or 
artificial) involved in the production or use of artificial creations that led to the 
harm (Cauffman 2018: 530--32). 
5.4 Economic Investment in Artificial Creations 
Coming up with artificial creators to produce artificial creations is an exorbitant 
enterprise (Plotkin 2009: 130). As such, persons (natural or artificial) who 
economically invest in artificial creators and artificial creations would normally 
expect good returns on their investments in order to be able to continue with 
artificial creativity. Hence, to protect artificial creativity against economic losses and 
encourage it, the State ought to grant appropriate intellectual property rewards. 
5.5 Key Takeaways 
Hence, intrinsic justifications for intellectual property rewards for artificial creativity 
do exist. However, intellectual property rewards need to be adjusted for artificial 
creativity. General modalities of intellectual property rewards for artificial creations 
are developed in the next chapter. 
6. General Modalities for Intellectual Property Rewards 
for Artificial Creations 
In this chapter, we develop general modalities for intellectual property rewards for 
artificial creations. 
6.1 Ascription for Artificial Creations 
Ascription is a function of human ingenuity and moral interest. 
 The total contribution of human ingenuity in producing artificial creations 
gets diminished, implying that they are less creative in comparison to creations 
that result from the exercise of pure human ingenuity (Burt and Davies 2018: 
250)  Even so, the source of an artificial creation lies with the human ingenuity of 50
the developer of the artificial creator who must have at least some moral interest in 
the artificial creation. Hence, honest ascription demands that such person must 
receive at least partial credit for the artificial creation; no ascription for artificial 
creations risks discouraging human creativity (Fraser 2016 ) and erasure of public 51
support for intellectual property (Dutfield 2013: 33).  
 The remaining part of the credit for the artificial creation cannot be granted 
to the artificial creator as it cannot intelligibly demonstrate moral interest in its 
creation. 
 Granting part-ascription for an artificial creation to the natural person whose 
human ingenuity is the source of that artificial creation serves not just a moral 
purpose, but also a functional (legal) purpose. Sometimes, artificial creations, by 
their very nature, might risk causing harm to public order and safety. In all such 
cases, granting part-ascription for an artificial creation to the person whose human 
ingenuity is the source of that creation would enable the State to hold that person 
liable for harm so as to generally discourage artificial creativity that is intrinsically 
harmful, at least to some extent regardless of the unpredictability of artificial 
creativity (Stilgoe 2018 ; Firth-Butterfield and Chae 2018 ).  52 53
 Arguing that the creator of an AI program that artificially produces a patentable invention autonomously 50
could might at best have a claim of joint inventorship.
 Claiming that inventorship enables scientists and engineers to gain professional credibility and monetary 51
benefits from their inventions.
 Claiming warning about accepting the fallacious autonomy of self-driving cars that companies might use to 52
shirk liability for mishaps caused by their self-driving cars.
 Stressing the need for a degree of human responsibility that ought to give proper direction to innovation 53
practices, in the absence of which innovations would risk leading to unintended and negative consequences.
 For instance, an artificial creator might encroach upon the intellectual 
property of others while producing its artificial creation. In such cases, the 
developer of that artificial creator should be able to demonstrate due diligence in 
developing and deploying her artificial creator in order to defend her liability for 
encroachment upon the intellectual property of others. Else, the developer must 
be held liable. 
 But, the developer of the artificial creator must be only part-liable for harm 
caused by the nature of the artificial creation. It is so because the eventual 
contribution of the developer of the artificial creation in producing artificial 
creations is negligible — implying that the exact nature and composition of the 
artificial creation could not have been predicted by the developer of the artificial 
creator. On the other hand, imposition of full liability for harm caused by the 
nature of the artificial creation on the developer of the artificial creator would be 
unfair and disproportionate and might have a chilling effect on artificial creativity. 
However, this does not imply that the remaining part of the liability should then be 
imposed on the artificial creator; the artificial creator cannot foreseeably 
demonstrate legal capacity to respond to liability claims. 
 In summary, natural persons whose human ingenuity is the source of 
artificial creations must be granted part-ascription for those artificial creations so 
that (a) their moral interests in those artificial creations are protected against 
abuse, and (b) they remain part-liable for mishaps owing to the nature of those 
artificial creations to discourage artificial creativity that is intrinsically harmful. 
6.2 Ownership of Artificial Creations 
Ownership is a function of legal capacity and economic investment (existence). 
 Producing artificial creations could be an exorbitant enterprise (Plotkin 
2009: 130). But, artificial creations cannot be owned like physical property to 
derive economic gains by selling or renting it. Artificial creations (like other 
creative products) are intangible and non-excludable by nature, and therefore, 
their physical possession is impossible. Hence, the State ought to grant a set of 
exclusive rights to the use and enjoyment of artificial creations for a limited period 
of time. This set of exclusive rights to the use and enjoyment of artificial creations 
constitutes the subject matter of ownership of artificial creations to make the 
possession of artificial creations possible for their natural creators or artificial 
persons who have economically invested in them. 
 The owner of an artificial creation may either be the developer of the 
artificial creator whose initial exercise of human ingenuity brought the artificial 
creation into existence (by virtue of receiving part-ascription for the artificial 
creation), or an artificial person (corporate) who acquires ownership from that 
developer (through employer-employee/work for hire agreements or through a 
simple purchase). The owner may choose to personally use or enjoy the artificial 
creation or sell it or rent out its certain uses to derive economic gains. The owner is 
also legally responsible for harms caused to public order and safety by the misuse 
of her artificial creation (as h/she could be reasonably presumed to exercise 
control over the use of her creation). Hence, the owner of the artificial creation 
must respond to liability claims resulting from harms to public order and safety 
caused by the misuse of her artificial creation. 
 To meaningfully acquire and exercise ownership over artificial creations and 
to respond to liability claims resulting from harm caused by the misuse of artificial 
creations, the owner must demonstrate legal capacity. Hence, the owner of an 
artificial creation could be the natural person in whose human ingenuity lies the 
source of the creation, or an artificial person (corporate) who may has 
economically invested in the creation — as these persons are legal persons. 
Artificial creators, on the other hand, do not demonstrate the legal capacity to 
meaningfully acquire and enforce ownership over their artificial creations or 
respond to liability claims resulting from harm caused by the misuse of their 
artificial creations (Abbott 2016a: 1107)  54
 Yet, there might be another concern around the ownership of artificial 
creations. Ownership of a creative product in intellectual property regimes flows 
from ascription over that product (i.e., creators are deemed first owners except if 
otherwise has been pre-determined by employer-employee/work for hire 
agreements). One might argue that part-ascription for an artificial creation justifies 
only its part-ownership. Part-ownership over an artificial creation might translate 
into reducing the number of exclusive rights to be granted over that artificial 
creation or the strength of enforceability of those rights or both. 
 But, then it must be balanced with the imposition of part-liability on owners 
for harms caused to public order and safety caused by the misuse of artificial 
creations. However, reduction in the liability of owners of artificial creations might 
seriously jeopardize public order and safety. If, on the other hand, liability of 
owners of artificial creations is not reduced in response to reduction in ownership 
(in the form of part-ownership), artificial creativity might end up being discouraged 
(Viscusi and Moore 1993 ). 55
 Arguing that artificial creators only act upon the instructions of its natural creator and remain entirely 54
agnostic about the use of their creations.
 Arguing that “misdirected liability may depress beneficial innovations”.55
 In summary, full ownership of artificial creations should be granted either to 
the developer of the artificial creator that produced that artificial creation (by virtue 
of receiving part-ascription for the artificial creation), or an artificial person 
(corporate) who acquires ownership from that developer (through employer-
employee/work for hire agreements or through a simple purchase) to hold them 
fully liable for the misuse of their artificial creations — towards securing public 
order and safety. 
6.3 Time-Specific Monopolies over Ownership of Artificial 
Creations 
Time-specific monopoly is a function of human ingenuity and economic 
investment (quantum). 
 If human ingenuity in a creative product is reduced, the length of the time-
specific monopoly granted for that product must also reduce (see Chapter 2.4). 
 Human ingenuity in artificial creations gets diminished. Hence, the length of 
the time-specific monopoly granted for an artificial creation must also reduce. The 
reduced time-period of such a monopoly must be less than what ought to be 
granted for a creative product that is result of the exercise of pure human 
ingenuity. If the length of the time-specific monopoly is not reduced in this way, 
human ingenuity (arguably, the source of many more artificial creators to come) 
would get undermined. Note that this is assuming the respective economic 
investments for the creative product and the artificial creation to be equal. 
 At the same time, the length of the time-specific monopoly granted for an 
artificial creation should also be a function of the quantum of economic 
investment that was put into that artificial creation. That is, the length of the such a 
monopoly should be just enough to enable the developer of the artificial creator 
which produced that artificial creation to recover her economic investment, i.e. 
earn normal profits from selling the artificial creation or renting out its certain uses. 
As for any other creative product, if the market demand for the artificial creation 
becomes favourable, such a monopoly would likely enable such developer of the 
artificial creator to increase the selling or renting price of her artificial creation (as 
in a monopoly, the consumers are price takers), and earn supernormal profits from 
selling the artificial creation or renting out its certain uses. 
 Such time-specific monopolies over the ownership of artificial creations 
could only be granted ex post as economic investments for them (even within the 
same statutorily designated intellectual property classification) might vary 
significantly. If, however, they are granted ex ante, i.e., without considering the 
quanta of economic investments that artificial creations may bear, they would risk 
under-rewarding artificial creations (discouraging artificial creativity) and over-
rewarding artificial creations (undermining human ingenuity). 
6.4 Key Takeaways 
From the discussions in this chapter, we can conclude that intellectual property 
rewards for an artificial creation should include: (a) part-ascription for the 
developer of the artificial creator whose initial exercise of human ingenuity 
brought that artificial creation into existence, and (b) reduced length of the time-
specific monopoly over the ownership of that artificial creation (in comparison to 
that of a creative product resulting from pure human ingenuity bearing equal 
economic investment) to be granted either to the developer of the artificial creator 
or the artificial person (corporate) who has economically invested in the artificial 
creation. The nature and composition of the set of exclusive rights (i.e., subject 
matter of ownership) should remain the same for artificial creations (falling under 
the same statutorily designated classification of intellectual property — copyright 
or patent). 
 Hence, the sum of rewards granted for artificial creations to incentivize 
artificial creativity has overall diminished in comparison to that for creative 
products resulting from the exercise of pure human ingenuity. This diminished sum 
of rewards for artificial creations is diminished intellectual property. In other words, 
intellectual property rewards for artificial creations are diminished intellectual 
property rewards. 
The table below summarizes these points: 
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7. Critique of the Treatment of Artificial Creativity by 
Current Intellectual Property Regimes 
This chapter contains a critique of the treatment of artificial creativity by current 
intellectual property regimes in different jurisdictions based on the intrinsic 
justifications for intellectual property rewards for artificial creativity and the general 
modalities for these rewards developed in the previous chapter.  
     Laws protecting copyrightable and patentable creations remain typically 
distinct from each other, and therefore, their treatment of artificial creativity have 
been discussed under separate heads depending on whether the artificial creation 
is copyrightable (“artificial work”) or patentable (“artificial invention”). 
7.1 Artificial Works 
Artificial works are creative products that would be typically copyrightable under 
copyright regimes if created by pure human ingenuity (i.e., by a human without 
using an artificial creator). 
United Kingdom. Laws in the United Kingdom do grant intellectual property 
rewards for artificial works. Section 178 of the UK Copyright Designs and Patents 
Act, 1988 (“CDPA 1988”) recognizes artificial works as works in which human 
authorship is absent.  The provision is plausible as human authorship should 56
demand full ascription for those artificial works to the natural person who 
developed the artificial creator. But, such natural person deserves only part-
ascription for those artificial works as her human ingenuity would be negligible in 
the moment of creation of those artificial works (as discussed in Chapter 5.1). 
 Section 9(3) of the CDPA 1988, however, is problematic for this very reason. 
It assigns authorship or full ascription for the artificial work to the developer of the 
artificial creator (Burt and Davies 2018: 244) . 57
 It is a disproportionate reward of ascription which risks undermining human 
ingenuity (arguably, the source of many more artificial creators to come) and might 
also unfairly invite legal liability for the person if the artificial work by its nature 
harms public order and safety — creating a chilling effect on artificial creativity (as 
discussed in the Chapter 6.1). 
 E.g., Nova Productions Ltd. v. Mazooma Games Ltd. & Ors. Rev. 1 [2006] EWHC 24 (Ch) at 104.56
 Arguing that such an assignment is a creation of legal fiction without any tenable justification.57
 The subject matter of ownership that is granted for artificial works under 
CDPA 1988 bears a semblance of neighbouring rights in copyright (Bently 2018). 
This is problematic for reasons discussed in Chapter 6.2. 
 The time-specific monopoly that is granted over the ownership of artificial 
works under CDPA 1988 is reduced to 50 years. It might be justified to the extent 
that another work being a product of pure human ingenuity and bearing equal 
economic investment receives a time-specific monopoly grant which is at least 
more than 50 years. However, the British Parliament has decided the 50-year 
period ex ante, i.e., by refusing to decide the length of the time-specific monopoly 
as also a factor of economic investment (quantum) which could vary for different 
artificial works that are yet to be generated by artificial creators. 
Europe. European laws and jurists do not endorse intellectual property rewards 
for artificial works. Even as European laws do not expressly prohibit granting 
intellectual property rewards for artificial works, European jurists argue that 
artificial works are not original. They do so by citing European judicial opinions 
holding that for a work to be original, it must reflect the personality of the author — 
implying that artificial works do not reflect the personality of the author (Iglesias et 
al. 2019: 14). 
 This argument is problematic. It is plausible to reckon that artificial works — 
for want of human authorship — may carry less of the personality traces of the 
natural person who developed the artificial creator. Even so, these traces are 
bound to exist (Shemtov 2018). They may or may not be clearly identifiable by 
everyone at all times. Nevertheless, they could always be argued to exist — at least 
in part — implying that the work generated by an artificial creator is original — at 
least in part — and entitling the natural person who developed the artificial creator 
to diminished intellectual property rewards. 
 The European position in holding that artificial works are not original 
preempts diminished intellectual property rewards for artificial works to the natural 
person who developed the artificial creator. Hence, according to the European 
position, artificial works ought to fall into the public domain — a proposal by some 
legal scholars (Perry and Margoni 2010; Schönberger 2018). 
 However, this is likely to discourage the investment in artificial creativity 
(Iglesias et al. 2019: 15). Lately, businesses have started using artificial works on a 
proprietary basis to advertise their products and services. Adoption of the 
European position on artificial works would discourage these businesses from 
doing so (Guadamuz 2017a, 2017b). 
United States. American laws expressly prohibit granting intellectual property 
rewards for artificial works. The Compendium of US Copyright Office Practices (like 
section 178 of the UK CDPA 1988) acknowledges the absence of human 
authorship in artificial works, but unlike section 9(3) of the UK CDPA 1988 does not 
assign authorship (or full ascription) for artificial works to the developers of 
artificial creators. 
 It does not allow any form of intellectual property rewards for artificial 
works, ultimately leading to similar policy outcomes led by the European position 
on artificial works. 
India. Indian laws (like UK laws) via Section 4(d)(iv) of the Indian Copyright Act, 
1957 grant intellectual property rewards for artificial works by assigning 
authorship (or full ascription) of artificial works to the developer of the artificial 
creator, leading to similar policy outcomes led by the English position on artificial 
works. 
7.2 Artificial Inventions 
Artificial inventions are creative products that would be typically patentable under 
patent regimes if created by pure human ingenuity (by a human without using an 
artificial creator). 
United Kingdom. In the United Kingdom section 7(2) the Patents Act, 1977 
defines the inventor as the “actual deviser of the invention”. The Act does not 
expressly mandate that such an inventor must be a natural person (Davies 2018: 
248). Hence, in principle, artificial creators producing artificial inventions could be 
deemed inventors. However, that would  (a) neglect the lack of moral interest and 
legal capacity of artificial creators to meaningfully enjoy inventorship over their 
artificial inventions (as discussed in Chapter 5.2 and Chapter 5.3), and (b) deny 
partial credit for the artificial invention that ought to be granted to the developer 
of the artificial creator, ultimately over-rewarding artificial creativity, undermining 
human ingenuity, and erasing public support for intellectual property (or creativity) 
(as discussed in Chapter 6.1). 
Europe. Like in the UK, European laws do not expressly provide that the inventor 
must be a natural person (Iglesias et al. 2019: 16-17) — ultimately leading to similar 
policy outcomes led by the UK position on artificial inventions. 
United States. United States laws differ from the UK and European positions on 
artificial inventions in that they mandate the inventor to be a natural person.  The 58
position of United States laws on artificial inventions would discourage artificial 
creativity that could produce numerous useful innovations in drug development, 
product design, etcetera. 
India. Indian laws do not expressly mandate that the inventor must be a natural 
person (Indian Patents Act, 1970; Soni and Singh 2019). Hence, they might lead to 
the similar policy outcomes led by the English position on artificial inventions.  
 In the absence of inventorship for artificial inventions, artificial inventions 
could be unpatentable in most jurisdictions — a proposal by some American legal 
scholars as well (McLaughlin 2018). This means that artificial inventions shall not be 
entitled for intellectual property rewards — discouraging artificial creativity that 
shows tremendous potential in drug development, design innovation, etcetera. 
 To correct this situation, even in the absence inventorship, diminished 
intellectual property rewards must be granted for an artificial invention to the 
developer of the artificial creator which produced that artificial invention. 
7.3 Key Takeaways 
From the discussions in this chapter, it is clear that the treatment of artificial 
creativity by current intellectual property in different jurisdictions is either 
improper or inadequate. Realizing the humungous business potential offered by 
artificial works and artificial inventions, the creative and innovation industries have 
started lobbying for law reforms in the intellectual property regime to 
accommodate artificial works and artificial inventions (Tata Consultancy Services 
and Confederation of Indian Industry 2019). Hence, law-makers, jurists, and most 
importantly, those who create and invest in artificial creators must come together 
to negotiate intellectual property rules that are proper and adequate to reward 
artificial creativity. In the next chapter, I propose a blueprint for granting specific 
intellectual property rewards for artificial works and artificial inventions. 
 1 U.S.C. Sec. 8(a) r/w 1 U.S.C. Sec. 1; Beech Aircraft Corp. v. EDO Corp., 990 F.2d 1237, 1248 n.23 (Fed. Cir. 58
1993); Karrer v. United States, 152 F.Supp. 66, 69 (Ct. Cl. 1957).
8. Specific Intellectual Property Rewards for Artificial 
Works and Artificial Inventions 
Intellectual property regimes should reward artificial creativity in a way that secures 
an optimal balance between incentivizing their production and enabling access to 
their use by creators and the society at large so as to ultimately maximize public 
welfare. This chapter discusses the two primary statutorily designated 
classifications of intellectual property, i.e., copyrightable creations and patentable 
creations, the core jurisprudential criteria defining them and enabling their 
classification, and how these criteria need to adapt to accommodate artificial 
works and artificial inventions. 
8.1 Artificial Works 
Copyrights are granted for creations that inter alia  demonstrate originality — a 59
modicum of human ingenuity (or creativity). Originality only means that the 
creation must emanate independently from an intellectual mind. That intellectual 
mind is deemed the author of that creation. Independent creation implies that the 
creation must not be copied from an already existing creation. A copyrighted 
creation receives protection against infringement only if the infringing material is 
the result of copying from that creation, i.e., independent reproduction of a 
copyrighted creation is a valid defence to a claim of copyright infringement of that 
creation (Christie 2011: 14). 
 The jurisprudential criteria for defining copyrightable creations makes it 
clear that ascription for a copyrightable creation is realized through authorship. 
Ownership of a copyrightable creation includes exclusive rights of reproduction, 
adaptation, sale, transfer through rental or lending, performance, and display of 
that creation by the owner. The time-specific monopoly granted over the 
ownership of copyrightable creations is typically fixed at the lifetime of the author 
— plus 50 to 100 years (depending on the jurisdiction). 
Specific Modalities. If a copyrightable creation is an artificial work, it ought to be 
protected by a diminished copyright. In line with the conclusions made in Chapter 
6, diminished copyright rewards for artificial works imply the following: 
     (1) Part-ascription for the artificial work ought to be granted to the 
developer of the artificial creator whose initial exercise of human ingenuity led to 
the artificial work. Part-ascription here does not imply part-authorship or co-
authorship. Authorship implies independent creation, i.e., originality, which is 
 To attract copyrightability, creations must also be fixed in tangible media.59
absent in artificial works as they could be deemed original only in part; human 
ingenuity remains absent in the moment of creation for artificial works (Marcus and 
Goncalves 2019: 72-75). A title of part-ascription for an artificial work granted to 
the developer of the artificial creator could be called post-authorship (i.e., 
something that is second to authorship). 
 Part-ascription for an artificial work could be shared between the 
developers of an artificial creator in proportion to their initial contributions of 
human ingenuity that led to the artificial work. All such developers of the artificial 
creator should be granted the title of joint post-authorship over the artificial work. 
      (2) The subject matter of copyright ownership over artificial works, i.e., the 
set of exclusive rights to be granted over artificial works ought to remain 
unchanged (for reasons discussed in Chapter 6.2). The subject matter of 
ownership could be shared via contractual arrangements between developers of 
artificial creators and persons (natural or artificial) who economically invested in 
the artificial works. 
      (3) The length of the time-specific monopoly to be granted over the artificial 
work must be determined ex post (i.e., after the work comes into existence). It 
should be determined as a function of the quantum of the economic investment 
that the artificial work carries and should be just enough to enable the person 
(natural or artificial) to recover that investment, i.e., earn normal profits from selling 
that artificial work or renting out its certain uses. A secondary consideration for 
determining the length of the time-specific monopoly to be granted over the 
artificial work could include an assessment of the market demand of the artificial 
work. 
     If the market demand for the artificial work becomes favourable, such a 
monopoly would likely enable the person (natural or artificial) to increase the 
selling or renting price of the artificial work (as in a monopoly, the consumers are 
price takers), and earn supernormal profits from selling such sale or rental. 
 Diminished copyright rewards for artificial works would ensure that artists 
and businesses are sufficiently incentivized to economically invest in them, use 
them for their branding, or sell them or rent out their certain uses in the market to 
earn profits, without reducing incentives for the production of works of pure 
human ingenuity that make creation of objects of art intrinsically meaningful and 
truly enrich human culture. 
Concerns. The implementation of diminished copyrights for artificial works might 
lead to some unintended policy outcomes in copyright regimes. 
 For instance, the prospect of diminished intellectual property rewards might 
lead persons (natural or artificial) to deliberately hide the involvement of artificial 
creativity in producing artificial works from the copyright office — so that artificial 
works could be registered with the copyright office as creative products resulting 
from pure human ingenuity to attract greater copyright rewards, i.e., authorship (or 
full ascription) and longer time-specific monopolies. 
 In such situations, copyright offices might risk over-rewarding artificial works 
because artificial works and works of pure human ingenuity tend to look extremely 
similar to each other and copyright offices might lack the capabilities to detect 
differences between the two (Michaux 2018). Such equal treatment of artificial 
works and works of pure human ingenuity would ultimately undermine and 
discourage creation of the latter (Schönberger 2018 ; Lauber-Rönsberg and 60
Hetmank 2019 ). Hence, requirements for disclosure of involvement of artificial 61
creativity could be made mandatory, and pecuniary penalties could be imposed 
on defaulters so as to discourage intentional non-disclosure. That said, evidence 
suggests that businesses willingly disclose the involvement of artificial creativity in 
artificial works they use — as a novel marketing strategy to sell these artificial works 
at enormous prices (Cherie 2019). 
8.2 Artificial Inventions 
Patents are granted for useful creations that demonstrate novelty and non-
obviousness/inventiveness — a much higher degree of human ingenuity (or 
creativity) than what copyright grants typically demand. A creation is deemed 
novel if the publicly available prior art does not mention or disclose it. It is deemed 
non-obvious/inventive if a person with ordinary skill in the art could not have 
created it obviously. A patented creation receives protection against infringement 
irrespective of whether the infringing material is the result of copying from that 
creation, i.e., independent reproduction of a patented creation is not a valid 
defence to a claim of patent infringement of that creation (Christie 2011: 14). 
     Ascription for a patentable creation is realized through inventorship. An 
inventor is a person who conceives the invention and reduces it to practice. 
Ownership of a patentable creation includes exclusive rights of use, manufacture, 
and transfer through sale or rental of that creation by the owner. The time-specific 
monopoly granted over the ownership of patentable creations is typically fixed at 
20 years across jurisdictions. 
 ibid (n14).60
 ibid (n16).61
Specific Modalities. If a patentable creation is an artificial invention, it ought to be 
protected by a diminished patent. In line with the findings in Chapter 6, diminished 
patent rewards for artificial works imply the following: 
     (2) Part-ascription for the artificial invention ought to be granted to the 
developer of the artificial creator whose initial exercise of human ingenuity 
brought the artificial invention into existence. Part-ascription here does not imply 
part-inventorship or joint inventorship. Inventorship implies conception of an 
invention and its reduction into practice,  which is absent in artificial inventions as 62
their nature and composition remain unpredictable to the developer who created 
the artificial creator; human ingenuity remains absent in the moment of creation of 
the artificial inventions. A title of part-ascription for an artificial invention granted to 
the developer of the artificial creator could be called post-inventorship (i.e., 
something that is second to inventorship).  
 
 Part-ascription for an artificial invention could be shared between 
developers of the artificial creator in proportion to their initial contributions of 
human ingenuity that led to the artificial invention. All such developers of the 
artificial creator should be granted the title of joint post-inventorship over the 
artificial invention. 
      (2) The subject matter of patent ownership over artificial inventions, i.e., the 
set of exclusive rights to be granted over artificial inventions ought to remain 
unchanged (for reasons discussed in Chapter 6.2). The subject matter of 
ownership could be shared via contractual arrangements between developers of 
artificial creators and persons (natural or artificial) who have economically invested 
in the artificial inventions. 
     (3) The length of the time-specific monopoly to be granted over ownership 
of the artificial invention must be determined ex post (i.e., after the invention 
comes into existence). It should be determined as a function of the quantum of the 
economic investment that the artificial invention carries and should be just enough 
to enable the person (natural or artificial) to recover that investment, i.e., earn 
normal profits from selling that artificial invention or renting out its certain uses. A 
secondary consideration for determining the length of the time-specific monopoly 
to be granted over the artificial invention could include an assessment of the 
market demand of the work. 
 If the market demand for the artificial invention becomes favourable, such a 
monopoly would likely enable the person (natural or artificial) to increase the 
 Townsend v. Smith, 36 F.2d 292 (1929).62
selling or renting price of the artificial invention (as in a monopoly, the consumers 
are price takers), and earn supernormal profits from selling such sale or rental. 
 Diminished patent rewards for artificial inventions would ensure that 
inventors and businesses are sufficiently incentivized to economically invest in 
them, use them for their branding, or sell them or rent out their certain uses in the 
market to earn profits — without reducing incentives for the production of 
inventions of pure human ingenuity (i.e., inventions conceived and reduced to 
practice by human inventors) that remains the primary source of the most 
groundbreaking inventions till date, including artificial creators, and arguably, truly 
inspires the innovation economy still. 
Concerns. However, the implementation of diminished patents for artificial 
inventions might create some friction in the patent regimes — 
 (a) One might apprehend the absurd possibility that diminished rewards for 
artificial inventions might constrain businesses to abandon the use of artificial 
creators and employ only pure human ingenuity instead to produce inventions 
that could receive greater patent rewards, i.e., inventorship (or full ascription) and 
longer time-specific monopolies (Abbott 2016a). But, this apprehension is likely to 
be false. 
 Artificial creators are typically great at producing artificial inventions that 
bear a strong semblance of combinatorial innovations. They do so by carrying out 
millions of simulations in no time and at reduced costs (Vertinsky and Rice 2002: 
576; King et al. 2009: 47; Burt and Davies 2018: 249) demonstrating a significant 
comparative advantage to human inventors (Knorr 2001; Marks 2015: 10, 32-35)  63
in producing combinatorial innovations.  
 Hence, the seeming undesirability of diminished patent rewards for artificial 
inventions should be set off by the ability of businesses to produce useful 
combinatorial innovations with greater efficiency if they use artificial creators — 
enabling them to outsell their counterparts operating without artificial creators 
(i.e., human inventors). Hence, while combinatorial innovations get relegated to 
artificial creators, pure human ingenuity (i.e., human inventors operating without 
artificial creators) will only get pushed to come up with inventions that are not 
merely combinatorial. 
 (b) There have been efforts to artificially conceive and publish several 
possible prior art to eventually precipitate the unpatentability of future inventions 
 Arguing that pure human ingenuity is ill-equipped to solve many highly complex problems, and hence, 63
unable to conceive many useful forms of innovation, like those dealing with the multiplicity of variables in 
nanotechnology and biotechnology.
—  both artificial and those produced by pure human ingenuity.  Some might view 64
it as unfairly discounting the novelty, and thereby patentability, of future human 
inventions, ultimately discouraging it. However, this view underestimates the 
potential of pure human ingenuity. Publication of prior art conceived artificially will 
only end up raising the bar for novelty that will only push human ingenuity to 
come up with truly novel inventions (with or without artificial creators) with great 
potentials to benefit the innovation economy. Moreover, it would also enable the 
State to exclude frivolous artificial inventions (cheaply produced with little practical 
use) from the scope of patentability (Vertinsky and Rice 2002: 608). 
 (c) Uncertainties lie around deciding the person having ordinary skill in the 
art (or PHOSITA) for the determination of non-obviousness of artificial inventions 
(Firth-Butterfield and Chae 2018). In 2015, a UK court in Teva v. Leo Pharma  65
explained that an invention was non-obvious so long as there was “no reasonably 
optimistic expectation” for its conception. Pertinently, the ruling was made in the 
context of an artificial invention. Hence, determining PHOSITA to determine the 
non-obviousness of an artificial invention, it is essential that a reasonably optimistic 
expectation of an invention from that PHOSITA could be derived. 
  A reasonably optimistic expectation of an artificial invention cannot be 
derived for artificial creators so long as their internal processes remain 
unpredictable (Blok 2017). Hence, proposals for raising the non-obviousness 
standard made out to be necessary — assuming the predominant use of certain 
artificial creators to invent products and processes in a certain industry (Abbott 
2019 ) — are bound to remain vague, imprecise, incomprehensible, and 66
impracticable. 
 On the other hand, predictability of artificial creators would imply that the 
conception of artificial inventions must be attributed to the developers of artificial 
creators. Hence, a reasonably optimistic expectation of an artificial invention could 
be derived only for the developers of artificial creators. In other words, human 
inventors operating without artificial creators should remain the PHOSITA to 
determine the non-obviousness of an artificial invention. 
      
 Some apprehend that doing so might put human inventors operating 
without artificial creators at a disadvantage in relation to their counterparts 
operating with artificial creators (Fraser 2016; Abbott 2016a). However, again, that 
 See ‘All Prior Art’ project by Alexander Reben, (https://areben.com/project/all-prior-art/) (accessed on 10 64
April 2020).  
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 Claiming that artificial creativity would eventually render all forthcoming innovations obvious, and thereby 66
unpatentable under the current patenting norms.
disadvantage would be set off by the ability of these human inventors (operating 
without artificial creators) to claim longer patent monopolies over their inventions 
in comparison to diminished patent monopolies over artificial inventions granted 
to their counterparts (operating with artificial creators). 
 (d) Traditional patent law demands an enabling disclosure from the inventor 
for the invention on which a patent is requested. This enabling disclosure must 
enable a PHOSITA to reduce the invention to practice (i.e., reproduce it) without 
employing any additional skill or experimentation. This demand of enabling 
disclosure for an invention by the State seeks to secure access to the invention by 
(i) fellow inventors who could build other useful inventions using the enabling 
disclosure, and (ii) businesses who can scale the production of the invention (after 
the expiry of the patent) and allow more consumers to benefit from it with cheaper 
prices. In this way, the State ensures that incentivizing inventions through patents is 
not carried out by compromising public welfare. 
 Artificial creations remain inexplicable to developers of artificial creators 
which produce these artificial creations. Hence, artificial inventions remain 
unpatentable under traditional patent law since a complete enabling disclosure 
akin to that for a human invention cannot be provided for them (World Intellectual 
Property Organization 2019b). However, diminished patents for artificial inventions 
may not need to comply with the expectations of traditional patent law. 
Diminished patent rewards could be argued to justify a partial relaxation of 
enabling disclosure requirements for artificial inventions. The requirements for the 
resulting disclosure for an artificial invention could be just enough to keep artificial 
creativity from becoming a trade secret. These requirements could be steadily 
developed by patent offices by analyzing the data on patent applications for 
artificial creations (Wamsley 2011). 
8.3 Key Takeaways 
From our discussions in this chapter we can summarize that diminished intellectual 
property rewards for artificial creations should comprise of: 
 (1) Part-ascription over the artificial creation for the developer of the artificial 
creator; titles of authorship/co-authorship for copyrightable creations and 
inventorship/joint-inventorship for patentable creations found in traditional 
intellectual property law ought to be discarded and replaced with titles of post-
authorship/joint post-authorship for artificial works and post-inventorship/joint 
post-inventorship for artificial inventions to be granted to the developer(s) of the 
artificial creator; 
 (2) Full ownership of the artificial creation for the developer of artificial 
creator and/or persons (natural or artificial) who have economically invested in the 
artificial creation; 
 (3) Time-specific monopoly over the ownership of the artificial creation to 
be decided ex post based on the quantum of economic investment that the 
artificial creation bears and its market demand. If deciding the time-specific 
monopoly component of diminished intellectual property rewards for each 
artificial creation ex ante looks too wieldy for copyright and patent offices, sub-
classifications under artificial works and artificial inventions could be devised, 
where each sub-classification represents and carries artificial creations bearing 
similar quanta of economic investment and market demand. 
 Hence, we can conclude that traditional copyright and patent rewards — 
their modalities and the criteria for their grant — do not need to be completely 
rejected or replaced with new rewards, but their modalities and the criteria for 
their grant must evolve to correspond to the uniqueness and variety of artificial 
works and artificial inventions. 
9. Conclusion 
A product is deemed creative when it demonstrates human ingenuity and exhibits 
potential to enrich human culture and advance human development. The function 
of intellectual property is to encourage the human ingenuity of the creator behind 
the creative product to produce more creative products. This secures the 
continuous enrichment of human culture and advancement of human 
development towards securing and maximizing public welfare. Artificial creations 
vary from creative products in that they demonstrate less human ingenuity (or 
creativity) in comparison to creative products, even as, arguably, both could hold 
equivalent potential to enrich human culture and advance human development.  
 Since artificial creations are not the same as creative products, they demand 
differential or exceptional treatment by the State. Artificial creations ought to be 
rewarded by the State through diminished intellectual property (like diminished 
copyrights for artificial works and diminished patents for artificial inventions). If not, 
it would lead to over-rewarding artificial creativity and under-rewarding human 
creativity, ultimately compromising public welfare. 
 Pertinently, this proposal for diminished intellectual property for artificial 
creations does not deviate fundamentally from the jurisprudence of intellectual 
property, but only provides a restructuring of its modalities to recognize and 
reward the peculiarity of artificial creativity by holding considerations of public 
welfare paramount. This restructuring (as opposed to a fundamental overhaul) of 
the modalities of intellectual property should be administratively and politically 
feasible for adoption by intellectual property regimes across the world due to the 
incremental nature of the policy improvement it proposes to recognize and reward 
artificial creativity (Lindblom 2016).  
 If artificial creators are to eventually precipitate the redundancy of human 
creativity as argued by some (Plotkin 2009: 8; Abbott 2016b: 1; Abbott: 2016b: 
13), and artificial creations (instead of human creations) would sought to be 
encouraged by the State to enrich human culture and advance human 
development, then intellectual property might not be the right legal/economic 
tool to achieve it. 
Appendix: Glossary 
Term Meaning
Artificial Creation A creative product that is generated by a highly 
advanced artificially intelligent system autonomously. 
Artificial Creativity The phenomenon of artificial creators producing artificial 
creations. 
Artificial Creator A highly advanced artificially intelligent system that is 
capable of producing creative products autonomously.
Artificial Invention A creative product that would be typically patentable 
under patent regimes if created by pure human 
ingenuity (i.e., by a human without using an artificial 
creator).
Artificial Work A creative product that would be typically copyrightable 
under copyright regimes if produced if created by pure 
human ingenuity (i.e., by a human without using an 
artificial creator).
Ascription An intellectual property reward granted by the State for 
a creative product that is necessarily determined by the 
contribution of human ingenuity and exhibition of moral 
interest of the creator in her creative product.
Creative Product/
Human Creation/
Creation
A product that is created by a natural person and that 
demonstrates a modicum of human ingenuity and 
potential to enrich human culture and advance human 
development.
Creativity/Human 
Creativity 
The phenomenon of natural persons producing creative 
products.
Creator/Human 
Creator
A natural person who produces a creative product using 
only her human ingenuity (i.e., by not using an artificial 
creator).
Economic 
Investment 
(Existence) 
The attribute in a creative product that enables 
ownership of exclusive rights over that creative product 
by an artificial person like a company.
Economic 
Investment 
(Quantum) 
The attribute in a creative product that ought to decide 
the length of the time-specific monopoly to be granted 
by the State over the ownership of that creative product.
Human Ingenuity A primary qualifier (broadly connoting originality) for a 
product to be deemed creative.
Intellectual Property Intellectual property is granted by the State to the 
creator for her creative product and includes a set of 
rewards, namely, ascription — acknowledging the creator, 
ownership — of a set of exclusive rights over the creation, 
and time-specific monopolies — setting the expiry date 
for those exclusive rights.
Legal Capacity The juridical capability of a creator to enjoy the 
intellectual property in her creative product and to 
respond to liability claims resulting from her creative 
product or its misuse.
Moral Interest The desire of a creator to be known for her creative 
product that ought to be derived from the contribution 
of her human ingenuity into her creative product and 
that enables her to receive ascription over her creative 
product in proportion to her contribution in her creative 
product.
Ownership An intellectual property reward granted by the State for 
a creative product that is necessarily determined by the 
legal capacity of the person (natural or artificial) and 
existence of economic investment in the creative 
product by that person to whom it ought to be granted.
Time-Specific 
Monopoly 
An intellectual property reward granted by the State 
over the ownership of a creative product that is 
necessarily determined by the contribution of human 
ingenuity of the creator and the quantum of economic 
investment in the creative product by the person (natural 
or artificial) to whom it ought to be granted.
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